Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring 2019

Article 6

2019

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bots, and How I
Learned to Start Worrying About Democracy Instead
Antonio F. Perez
Catholic University, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons,
Law and Society Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, Other
Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Antonio F. Perez, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bots, and How I Learned to Start Worrying
About Democracy Instead, 27 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech 129 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol27/iss2/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING
AND LOVE THE BOTS, AND HOW I
LEARNED TO START WORRYING ABOUT
DEMOCRACY INSTEAD:
A REVIEW ESSAY ON STRIKING POWER: HOW
CYBER, ROBOTS, AND SPACE WEAPONS
CHANGE THE RULES OF WAR
1

Antonio F. Perez*
I. Striking Power’s Debatable Premises ............................................................... 132
A. Technology—The Rise of the Bots ............................................................... 132
B. International Law—Realism and Its Alternatives ........................................ 136
C. Grand Strategy—The Challenge to Democratic Enlargement .................... 139
II. Why Striking Power’s Best Form of Government May Not Be Our Form of
Government.......................................................................................................... 141

The title of this article hearkens back to Stanley Kubrick’s brilliant 1964 film,
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,2
released in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and in the context of that
period’s great debate on Mutually Assured Destruction—or so-called “MAD”
doctrine—as the roadmap to deterrence and peace in the nuclear age. The MAD
theory posits that the first use of nuclear weapons will result in massive
retaliation by the other side leading to the destruction of both sides; hence game
or strategic theory would predict that no first use will ever be launched.3 Well,
* Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America. I
thank Andrew Coley, Columbus School of Law Class of 2019, for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1
Jeremy Rabkin and John Yoo, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND SPACE
WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR (Encounter Books (2017)) [Striking Power].
2
See PETER GEORGE, DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND
LOVE THE BOMB (1964), summarized in Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2019).
3
See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History 80 (The Penguin Press 2005)
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for those familiar with the film—and for others, a “spoiler alert”—Kubrick’s
film points out that the theory did not account for the messiness and irrationality
of human life. On one hand, the film depicts a stark-raving mad Air Force
General who viewed “fluoridation of water” for dental health as a covert
Communist plot to reduce the testosterone levels of American males and who
has been delegated the authority to launch a nuclear attack. On the other, there
is a Soviet Premier’s predilection for surprise announcements, including the
construction of a Soviet “Doomsday device” that, in the logical culmination of
the MAD theory, would indeed assure the destruction of the whole planet’s
surface through a robotic and irreversible response to any nuclear denotation in
Soviet territory. The combination of these two potentially foreseeable human
and non-human actors, one with too much freedom and the other with too little,
lead to tragically inhumane results.
The title turns on one of three characters played by the great British actor,
Peter Sellers, in a tour de force performance. Dr. Strangelove is the hyperrational advisor to the U.S. president, clearly of German origin and impliedly a
former advisor to Fuhrer Hitler, who does not seem to feel one way or another
about the situation except to deal with its consequences. Meanwhile the other
characters include a rather confused and dimwitted president, obsessed with his
own honor and place in history, and a disabled and frightened British air force
officer seconded to the staff of the American General responsible for this mess.
The three characters combine three motivators—rational self-interest, honor,
and fear—that classical troika thinkers, such as Thucydides, believed could give
rise to tragedy in human affairs.4 Together, the characters reveal the limits of the
human condition and dangers of hubris that do not take into account those limits.

(Kennedy Administration Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara believed that sheer terror
prevented war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Making a virtue of apparent necessity,
McNamara proclaimed Mutually Assured Destruction as the new national security strategy.
According to preeminent Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, “its acronym, with wicked
appropriateness, was MAD. The assumption behind it was that if no one could be sure of
surviving a nuclear war there would not be one”); See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 750
(Simon & Shuster 1994) (Writing decades later reflecting on the initial criticism of MAD,
Henry Kissinger judged that the threat of national suicide was never a credible basis for
national security strategy. No adversary threatening U.S. interests and allies would consider
such a threat credible. Hence, MAD was bound to “undermine morale and destroy existing
alliances.” In Kissinger’s view, developing technology would eventually enable nuclear
powers to develop strategic defenses to nuclear attack, thus deterring aggression and
maintaining alliances).
4
See Robert Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides, THE LATIN LIBRARY,
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/thucydides1.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2019) (explaining Athens rise to power, the consequent threat that posed to Greek stability,
and ultimately the outbreak of the Peloponnesian wars at the fruit of self-interest, honor and
fear).
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What does this have to do with Striking Power5 by Professors John Yoo,6 an
academic lawyer present at the creation of the Global War on Terror in the wake
of the 9/11 attacks, and Jeremy Rabkin,7 a former political scientist turned law
school professor teaching international law? Briefly, what I will argue here is
that Striking Power admittedly builds a powerful case for heightened reliance on
increasingly autonomous weapons and weapons systems that reduce the level of
human intervention as much as is humanly possible—whether through aerial
drones, cyberattacks, or space weapons. That case, however, turns on merely
plausible and decidedly contestable assumptions concerning U.S. grand strategy,
the relatively limited constraints imposed by international law on the
developments and use of such weapons, and their likely capacity to operate with
appropriate limits (both in their initial targeting and freedom from uncontrolled
escalation). However, in questioning these assumptions, this article does not
seek to come to a final conclusion but only to suggest that Striking Power’s
argument should not yet form the basis for policy. Many serious experts with
more specific knowledge about weapons system and robotics, and other scholars
of grand strategy, would challenge each of Striking Power’s explicit or implicit
premises. More importantly, the rise of autonomous technology in war-fighting
must be considered to have a role in increasing the dominance of economy and
politics by technological elites. Indeed, the rise of the robots (and technology
generally) could, as many now argue, have deleterious effects on the need for
elites to engage the support of the larger populace to sustain the economy and
enables elites to more effectively manipulate mass public opinion required for
mass mobilization. If so, the rise of autonomous weapons will increasingly
undermine an American way of war that was built on mass mobilization,
morally-accountable and well-trained citizen soldiers, benefiting from broadbased political support for the use of force, and support of the construction of
international coalitions advancing a common global good. In short, if Striking
Power is right, it cannot help but have implications for the kind of constitutional
order best adapted to the rise of bots in war—a kind of government we do not
now imagine and may not find attractive if we could. So, I merely seek to counter
Rabkin and Yoo’s Pangloss with a warning from Cassandra.8
5
JEREMY RABKIN & JOHN YOO, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND SPACE
WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR (2017).
6
John Yoo Biography, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ourfaculty/faculty-profiles/john-yoo/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
7
See Jeremy A. Rabkin, GEO. MASON U.: ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/rabkin_jeremy.
8
The Myth of Cassandra, GREEK MYTHS AND GREEK MYTHOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.greekmyths-greekmythology.com/the-myth-of-cassandra (stating Cassandra
was a princess of Troy and blessed with the gift of foreseeing the future; “Her curse was that
no one believed her.” This fact significantly influenced the destruction of Troy during the
Trojan War).
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STRIKING POWER’S DEBATABLE PREMISES

I.

Let me consider the premises of Striking Power before considering its
constitutional implications. Because technology appears to drive its analysis,
one should first examine Striking Power’s love affair with the asserted virtues
of autonomous weapons, a passion that is not free from plausible critique. Next,
we can locate Striking Power’s willingness to engage in this alliance with the
bots in its intense animus for international law, or at least a particular view of
international law, that would plausibly constrain at least some of the most
attractive applications of remote and/or autonomous weapons. Finally, it is
arguable that these two premises—learning to love the bots and fear of
international law—flow from a deeper strategic premise. This seemingly
implicit, but rather contestable, assumption may be the goal of pursuing a less
active role in world affairs to preserve American honor from the messiness of
engagement and cooperation in a multi-polar world dominated by authoritarian
regimes.
A. Technology—The Rise of the Bots
Yoo and Rabkin’s relative lack of technical expertise on the reliability of the
bots may spawn the weakest premise of their argument. At the risk of caricature,
they seem to treat theoretical possibilities as morally certain outcomes. Thus,
they observe and then posit:
The United States now fields thousands of UAVs both for
reconnaissance and attack. Armed with stealth technology these
robots gather intelligence around the clock and launch immediate
attacks in trouble spots around the world. In the future, the most
advanced ground and sea-based armed forces will employ remotecontrolled units, such as sentries, light armor, and littoral naval
vessels. Advances in missile technology and precision targeting
will allow the United States to field a conventional global-strike
capability that can hit any target in the world within an hour. Some
experts even predict that autonomous weapons systems will soon
be able to act free of direct human control.9
By contrast, Paul Scharre, former Army Ranger Sniper Team Commander in
Afghanistan, expert at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and currently a
Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at
the Center for A New American Security, who has spent a better part of the last
decade studying autonomous weapons, offers a significantly more measured
9

RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 5.
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view.10 Indeed, his central contribution to the study of the new technologies is
to locate them in a moral context that flows from his experience as an American
soldier.11 Scharre is not alone in examining the technical, legal and moral
debates concerning drones and their like in a balanced way.12 But his technical
presentation for lawyers and political scientists also provides insight to two
critical factual dimensions otherwise missing in so much discussion of the
technological revolution of military affairs. First, Scharre draws upon the
operational military perspective from his experience as a soldier and bureaucrat
to inform the use of partially and fully autonomous weapons. Second, he
provides insight into recent developments in computer science, such as the
emergence of deep-neural networks, ranging from human programmed
DeepBlue’s dominance over human chess players13 to DeepMind’s self-taught
strategy that defeated the best human player in the infinitely more complex
Chinese game of Go.14
Indeed, focusing on the human interface with military expertise and computer
science, Scharre begins his recent book, Army of None,15 with an account of a
nuclear near-miss in 1983. At the height of political tensions between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R., a single Soviet Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov’s decision to
disregard protocol prevented a Soviet nuclear launch in response to a computer
glitch’s erroneously perceived U.S. nuclear first-strike.16
Scharre usefully locates the study of autonomous weapons systems in several
larger contexts, to include broad military decision making, specific machine
applications based on environments, and the coordination of all complex
systems.17 To begin with, the concept of autonomy is unpacked in the context of
the overall military decision heuristic of the observe-orient-decide-act

10 Paul Scharre, CTR. NEW AM. SECURITY (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnas.org/people/
paul-scharre (“From 2008-2013, Mr. Scharre worked in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) where he played a leading role in establishing policies on unmanned and
autonomous systems and emerging weapons technologies. Mr. Scharre led the DoD working
group that drafted DoD Directive 3000.09, establishing the Department’s policies on
autonomy in weapon systems.”).
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., KEN ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, DEBATING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON
SYSTEMS, THEIR ETHICS, AND THEIR REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY, chap. 45 (2017) (rejecting a
categorical ban on autonomous weapons and calling for a more nuanced debate).
13 Larry Greenemeier, 20 Years after Deep Blue: AI Has Advanced Since Conquering
Chess, SCI. AMERICAN (June 2, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/20-yearsafter-deep-blue-how-ai-has-advanced-since-conquering-chess.
14 See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF
WAR 125 (2018).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
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(“OODA”) loop. OODA is a loop because after-action observation then feeds
into an iterative process.18 In short, useful discussions of autonomy require focus
on the particular phase of information processing selected.19 It follows that the
capacity of machines to perform such tasks varies with the complexity of the
environment. Hence, automaticity must be programed in terms of decision
variables—ranging from single-variable, simple threshold based programs, such
as a thermometer’s role in an automated air-conditioning system; complex, rulebased approaches processing multiple variables; and finally goal-oriented
programs, such as for a fully autonomous car, that would entrust the machine to
make all decisions relevant to achieving a specified goal.20
Finally, Scharre highlights the critical question of coordination among various
weapons system, identifying a range of approaches that turn on the level of
automaticity delegated to non-human decision-making. These approaches range
from centralized coordination, with “swarm elements coordinating with a
centralized planner”; hierarchical coordination, with “swarm elements
controlled by ‘squad’ level agents, who are in turn controlled by higher-level
agents”; coordination by consensus, in which “all swarm elements communicate
with one another and then use ‘voting’ or auction-based methods to converge on
a solutions; and emergent coordination, in which “coordination arises naturally
with individual swarm elements reaction with one another, like animal
swarm.”21 Scharre even locates the whole question of autonomy in weapons
systems in the larger context of the ongoing debate over the risk of delegated
decision-making in all human activities, ranging from thermostats to launching
an ICBM.22
In Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk: Ethical Autonomy Project,
an article published prior to Army of None, Scharre recalls the image of a
mythical half-man, half-beast known as the Centaur, to imagine the use of
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons as “Centaur Warfighting.”23 In
other words, depending on the details that will emerge from experience, analysis
and good practical judgment, there will always be a role for humans in concert
with machines. Humans as “essential operators” without which military
engagements cannot succeed; as “moral agents,” who will judge whether or not

See, e.g., id. at 22-23.
See id. at 43-45.
20 See id. at 31-32.
21 See id. at 20-21.
22 See id. at 192 (“Fire-and-forget missiles cannot be recalled once launched, but their
freedom to search for targets in space and time is limited.”).
23 PAUL SCHARRE, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
AND OPERATIONAL RISK 41 (2016), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/autonomousweapons-and-operational-risk.
18
19
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military necessity outweighs the potential for collateral damage; and as “failsafe,” with the ability to intervene if circumstances change so that an operation
is no longer appropriate.24 In sum, unlike Striking Power, Scharre’s multiple
layers of normative and factual analysis enable him to raise important questions
that facilitate a sophisticated appreciation of autonomy’s risks, benefits, and
qualifiers that call into question the promise of military effectiveness and
collateral harm reduction. Perhaps this is because Scharre is not simply in pursuit
of a larger legal and strategic agenda.
It is striking that Machiavelli, known as the father of a dogmatic version of
modern political realism, the tradition in which Striking Power is best located,
is perhaps better understood as a more synthetic, idealistic thinker.25 Like
Scharre, Machiavelli employed the image of the Centaur as the metaphor
through which he explained to the Prince the relation of war to law:
You should know, then, that there are two ways of fighting: one
with law, the other with force: the first way is peculiar to man, the
other to beasts: but since the first in many instances is not enough,
it becomes necessary to resort to the second. Therefore, a prince
must know how to make use of the beast and the man. This role
was taught to princes indirectly by the ancient writers, who wrote
how Achilles and many other ancient princes were given to Chiron
the Centaur to be brought up and trained under his direction. This
can only mean, as they had for a teacher a half-beast and half-man,
that prince ought to know how to make use of both natures and the
one without the other cannot endure.26
Perhaps by invoking the image of the Centaur, Scharre locates Army of None
in a tradition that gives equal weight to military necessity or advantage and to
the international law of war understood as a set of moral imperatives. Here too
his agenda may depart from Rabkin and Yoo’s goals in Striking Power.

24 Id. at 45 (explaining even in “fail-safe” mode, in the event of communication loss,
rules of engagement would still need to consider whether or not autonomous systems will be
allowed to engage only previously authorized targets (“fail-safe”), further authorized to
engage targets in self-defense (“fail-dangerous”), and perhaps even emergent targets of
opportunity not specifically pre-authorized (“fail-deadly”)).
25 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE ART OF CREATING POWER: FREEDMAN ON STRATEGY 284
(Benedict Wilkinson & James Gow eds. Oxford University Press 2018) (discussing
Machiavelli’s political idealism in terms of the ethical responsibilities of a political leader to
serve the creation of an Italian republic); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF
COURT AND PALACE: MACHIAVELLI AND THE WORLD THAT HE MADE 6-7 (Daedalus Books
2013).
26 NICCOLÓ M ACHIAVELLI, MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE: A BILINGUAL EDITION, 145
(Daedalus Books 2013).
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B. International Law—Realism and Its Alternatives
International law concerning the use of force can be divided into two
categories. First, the jus ad bellum concerns whether or not a use of force is
lawful and legitimate, which is now largely based on Articles 2(4) and 51 of the
UN Charter.27 Second, the jus in bello concerns whether or not a particular use
of force comports with rules and principles designed to regulate the manner in
which force is used, specially the humanitarian law establishing the principles
of necessity (requiring a definite military advantage), discrimination (avoidance
of targeting civilians) and principles of humanity such as the avoidance of
unnecessary suffering in the conduct of war.28 It is worth noting that Rabkin and
Yoo engage in a sustained attack on certain interpretations of these principles
that some have relied upon to criticize U.S. conduct on the Global War on Terror.
They argue that international jus in bello should instead accommodate itself to
the possibilities for increased discrimination and the avoidance of unnecessary
suffering made possible by the emerging technologies.29 But, for present
purposes in detailing the more expansive use of emerging technology of
autonomous weapons as the defining element of U.S. grand strategy, it is more
revealing to focus instead on their views concerning the jus ad bellum,
specifically the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force, except in response
to an armed attack or as authorized by the UN Security Council.30
Rabkin and Yoo acknowledge that U.S. drone strikes are consistent with the
UN Charter:
only if we expand the concept of self-defense to include the
anticipation of an attack, even one that may not be imminent. In
other words, the United States might claim that anticipatory selfdefense allows preemptive strikes when the probability of an
attack is small, but the potential for destruction is high. Or the
United States and its allies must admit that they are engaging in
preventive war designed to nip challenges to international security
in the bud, even when there is no immediate claim to selfdefense.31

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, art. 51.
See generally GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 14 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press 2013).
29 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 13 (“Yet many scholarly commentators and
government officials still tend to view the law of war in quite formalist ways. They rely on
textual provisions of AP I [the 1977 Additional Protocol to the 1949 Conventions on the
Law of War], U.M. resolutions, and even dicta found in ICJ ruling and advisory opinions.”).
30 Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN
Charter Regime, 24 ELIJ 151, 151 (2013).
31 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 27.
27
28
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The implicit premise here is either that the UN Charter conception of the
international law concerning the use of force is more elastic and responsive to
changing technology than others may believe or that, if the UN Charter is not
amenable to flexible interpretation, it ought to be disregarded when it does not
conform to a single nation’s appreciation of its national interest or its subjective
judgment of the global interest. As suggested by historian Isabel Hull’s
discussion of the British and German response to the legal challenges presented
by the revolution in military affairs concerning aerial bombardment and the
emergence of the submarine in A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making
International Law During the Great War,32 Yoo and Rabkin’s methodological
claims are more akin to the overall standpoint of German lawyers during World
War I than to those of their British counterparts. Here, I want only to explain
how these methodological premises revealed in Anglo-German debate, given
their timeliness at the centenary of the end of the Great War, are again at issue
in the premises of Yoo and Rabkin’s argument. In short, their view of
international law would ally the U.S. now with the approach of Germany
whereas our traditional views are of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The German position, in brief, considered international law to be an
incomplete system in which specific accommodations had been reached to
address particular issues.33 It followed that there were gaps in the law, so-called
non liquets; and one principal form of gap was the emergence of new
technologies in warfare, including the submarine. It followed that the rules
would not govern attacks on vessels, including civilian and even neutral
commerce that had been developed in a world of cruisers. Cruisers could
effectively capture contraband without unnecessary loss of life and without
significant risk to the capturing vessel. The rules governing these attacks were
simply ill-adapted to submarines, which could not capture vessels engaging in
unpermitted commerce without civilian casualties or undue risk to the submarine
itself or its crew.34 Moreover, even if the international law governing cruisers
did apply to the activities of submarines, the use of submarines would
nonetheless be justified by political considerations.35 Indeed, the humane path
was a maximum use of force in order to bring unnecessary suffering to an end,
32 See ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL
LAW DURING THE GREAT WAR 174-175 (Cornell University 2014) [A Scrap of Paper].
33 Anne-Charlotte Martineau, The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in
International Law, 22 LEIDEN J INT’L. L. 1, 1-2 (2009) (discussing the general European
view on international law); see Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the
Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 265, 270 (2009) (discussing
fragmentation of international law from the German practitioner’s perspective).
34 See HULL, supra note 31, at 197; see also Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and
the World Court, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399, 429-34 (1997) (discussing non-liquet in the
context of its application of the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion).
35 See HULL, supra note 31, at 221.
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since “a quick war is the most human.”36
The British, by contrast, argued against discontinuities in international law,
such as non-liquets brought about by a revolution in military technology. This
perhaps reflected the difference between Anglo-American common law
reasoning and civilian approaches based on statutory solutions. In the German
view, there had not been new international legislation or even bilateral contracts
regarding the new weapons. By contract, the British generally believed that
“customs, state practices, and Prize Court decisions”— which implemented the
law concerning neutrals rights to be free from capture when engaging in neutral
commerce before a neutral adjudicator—were “the kinds of precedents that
indicated law.”37 Hence, Britain argued that “all vessels were subject to the rules
of humanity that dictated saving passengers and crew before sinking merchant
ships.”38 Thus, the British view treated international law, not as a set of
conditional commitments based on particular balances of advantage, but rather
an underlying set of moral imperatives of a community of states. According to
Hull, it could be described as Britain’s:
self-conception as a law-abiding state, its domestic government,
its sense of international law as a product of a society of states to
which Britain belonged and aspired to lead, its consequent
recognition of other states as their interests as formative of law, its
understanding that its own interests varied over time, and
circumstance (as a neutral trader or as a belligerent), its awareness
of its independence of the Prize Court and the Privy council as
appeals court, and its concern for the often different views of its
own allies.39
The difference between these British and German views arguably corresponds
to the modern divide between the so-called “realist” and “constructivist”
understandings of international law, a debate which shows no sign of abating, at
least in academic circles.40 For it reflects a debate on the priority of law over
politics, or politics over law, as much as it also reflects distinct views on both
politics and on the nature of international law, such as through the legislation of
the UN Security Council or treaty-making by states, rather than found or natural
Id. at 230.
Id. at 195.
38 Id. at 197.
39 Id. at 206-07.
40 Compare JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171
(Oxford University Press 2005) (advancing the realist view that takes interests as givens and
defined largely by material circumstances); with OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO,
THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 27
(Simon & Schuster 2017) (the constructivist perspective that defines interests as emerging
out ideals).
36
37
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law or jus cogens. Neither of these extremes, however, reflects the received
grand strategy of U.S. foreign policy, which arguably mediated both during and
after the Cold War between interests and ideals.
C. Grand Strategy—The Challenge to Democratic Enlargement
Striking Power’s promise is that:
Robotics, cyber, and space weapons can reduce the size of ground
forces needed to wage war. They can withdraw human soldiers
from the battlefield while making attacks more precise and deadly.
They can allow nations to coerce each other without inflicting the
same level of casualties and destruction as in the past. They can
reach far beyond borders to pick out terrorists or selectively
destroy WMD sites. They can reduce the costs that discourage
western nations from stopping humanitarian disasters or civil
wars. While armed conflict will continue as a feature of the human
condition, it might come at lower cost, for a shorter time, and with
less violence.41
But one might argue that this is grand strategy on the cheap, one that responds
only to extreme problems with minimal footprint and is geared toward premature
exit strategies that would leave behind the root causes of the problems that
caused the instabilities that first prompted intervention. It is a strategy that
reverses the lessons of World War I, after which the U.S. turned isolationist,
lessons that were learned well enough to warrant U.S. deployments in Europe,
South Korea and Japan now for three-quarters of a century after the end of the
conflicts that initially brought them there. The established U.S. strategy in the
post-Cold War environment is best summarized in the Clinton Administration’s
so-called strategy of democratic enlargement42 and President Bush’s Second
Inaugural Address,43 both of which were premised on the idea that the internal
structure of other states as democratic polities was a necessary condition of U.S.
national security. The question Rabkin and Yoo pose is whether or not the spread
of democracy through U.S. engagement remains essential to the maintenance of
world order in which the U.S. has thrived since the end of World War II, or
whether the U.S. would be even better off through a different national grand
strategy.44
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 3.
THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENTS 2 (1996).
43 George W. Bush, President of The U.S., Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005)
(transcript available in The Avalon Project at Yale Law School).
44 See JAMES M. LINDSAY & IVO H. DAALDER, THE EMPTY THRONE: AMERICA’S
ABDICATION OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 1-3 (2018) (providing a balanced appraisal of the
41
42
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Of course, grand strategy is largely about the relationship between available
means and the ends that best fit those means.45 According to one perceptive
observer, the massive retaliation strategy in the event of any nuclear first use
was constructed primarily to relate U.S. military strategy to the Eisenhower
administration’s judgment that preservation of the status quo in Europe, meaning
deterrence of Soviet invasion, could not be achieved solely by conventional
forces.46 Rather, the threat of use of nuclear weapons would be necessary for
deterrence. Moreover, a politically-unsustainable burden on the U.S. economy
is avoidable by reducing the costs of conventional defense.47 This strategic shift
appears to be the premise driving Striking Power’s resistance to theories of
international law that are based on consensual and incremental change, what it
describes as “frozen law in a changing world.”48 Thus one wonders whether or
not Rabkin and Yoo’s technological optimism and restrictive theory of
international law, like the Eisenhower administrations flirtation with MAD, are
necessary corollaries of their preferred grand strategy.
Recently, at least one military strategist has offered a contrary view. Michael
O’Hanlon, a former advisor to the CIA, adjunct professor at both Princeton and
Columbia University, and currently a Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution,49 contends that for the foreseeable future the U.S. will require largescale army and marine units to achieve its national security objectives.50
O’Hanlon writes:
The goal is not to undertake a number of imminent large-scale
missions; we have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan about the
limits, challenges, and the costs of such operations. But . . .
deterrence of other great powers as well as smaller powers such as
North Korea, and of being able to help stabilize key trouble spots
that may be afflicted with various forms of civil warfare, terrorism,
natural disaster, or other maladies, require substantial American
Trump administration’s strategic shift from engagement in the direction of isolationism).
45 See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 21-22 (Penguin Press 2018)
(explaining that all of humanity has been using relationships to garner an advantage as a
strategy); see generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Oxford 1982).
46 See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 59, 267, 304 (Penguin Press 2018);
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 145-49, 187-88, 204-05 (Oxford 1982).
47 See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 59, 267, 304 (Penguin Press 2018)
(explaining that the Cold War never became a real ‘hot’ war because of the nuclear weapon
deterrence and containment strategies used to maintain the status quo); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS,
STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 145-49, 187-88, 204-05 (Oxford 1982).
48 See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 9-14.
49 See Michael E. O’Hanlon Biography, BROOKINGS INSTIT.,
https://www.brookings.edu/experts/michael-e-ohanlon/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
50 MICHEL E. O’HANLON, THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE, xii-xiii (2015).
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ground forces. Drones, cyberwarfare, and special forces cannot do
it all; pretending that we can turn our backs on insurgency simply
because Iraq and Afghanistan proved so hard is not viable either.51
O’Hanlon thus refers to the “so-called revolution in military affairs,”52 and
maintains that “robotics and advanced computing” are yet “redefining warfare
in a radical way.”53 In short, O’Hanlon’s alternative universe is premised on the
need for continued and expensive deployments performing missions for which
the bots cannot substitute.
In sum, Striking Power imagines a world of low technological risks, low legal
constraint, and limited U.S. global engagement. Scharre, Hull and O’Hanlon
would undoubtedly each disagree with at least one of these premises (and
perhaps all three). But it is equally fair to consider the possibility that Rabkin
and Yoo are correct, that these premises describe the world as it is and will be
as this iteration of the ongoing revolution in military affairs proceeds. But even
if that is the world we are entering, it will not be without risks for the very
constitutional order Rabkin and Yoo, as scholars of American constitutional law
and history, would almost certainly wish to preserve.
II. WHY STRIKING POWER’S BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT MAY
NOT BE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Athenian democracy, in the words of Philip Bobbitt, commenced an
“epochal” war—meaning a war whose resolution signaled a discontinuity in the
form of the state, one that ultimately culminated in the defeat of Greek city-states
by Macedonian Monarchy.54 But for our purposes, the rise of Athenian
democratic power, and the plausibility of its claim to superiority over Spartan
autocracy and even Persian Monarchy, rested on the Greek citizen-sailor.55 As
Victor Davis Hanson observes, it was the expertise of Athenian sailors,
developed over years of commitment to their craft, that assured Athenian
maritime superiority, and thus the basis for Athens’s power and strategy.56 And
what assured this commitment? It was that,
[a]t least at the start of the war, at Athens the rowers were for the
most part all free voting citizens in a manner not true of the
Peloponnesian fleet, suggesting that there unique élan at sea was a
Id.
Id. at 15.
53 Id. at 166.
54 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 21-23 (2002).
55 See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER: HOW THE ATHENIANS AND
SPARTANS FOUGHT THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 251 (Random House 2005).
56 Id. at 251-52.
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reflection that oarsmen felt that they had a state in the very society
they rowed to defend.57
Will that be true for the U.S. military in the age of the robots? Will the
irrelevance of mass forces make mass voters irrelevant too? Increasingly the
Congress fails to discharge it responsibility to police the Executive Branch’s use
of force.
Already commentators perceive the risk that in our economy and society vast
numbers are being left behind and becoming unnecessary to the production of
the intellectual property that now comprises the largest portion of American
wealth.58 With Orwellian overtones, another commentator observes that the
robotics revolution insofar as it increases military capacity to confront urban
insurgency has important implications for domestic liberty and privacy. 59
Antitrust scholars point to the increasing concentration of economic power in
fewer hands, as the computing revolution of the last quarter century appears to
have spawned higher concentration ratios in virtually all U.S. industries, not only
those in the computer sector.60 This concentration of power and freedom from
dependence on the U.S. government has reportedly now enabled at least one
U.S. corporation, presumably Google, to refuse to do business with the Defense
Department, subordinating the national interest to that elite corporation’s other
agendas.61
In short, dominance of the commanding heights of U.S. technology by a
fortunate few, coupled with a grand strategy that diminishes the need for broadbased support for a largely citizen-military and a diminution of a once “decent

Id. at 253.
See Yuval Noah Harari, Why Technology Favors Tyranny, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/yuval-noah-hararitechnology-tyranny/568330/.
59 See Chris Meserole, Wars of None: AI, Big Data, and the Future of Insurgency,
LAWFARE (July 1, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/wars-none-ai-big-data-and-futureinsurgency.
60 See JAMES BESSEN, THE POLICY CHALLENGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, B.U. SCH.
L.: L. & ECON. at 2 (Research Paper) (July 2018).
61 See. e.g., Rob Gillies, US military chief says tech giants should work with Pentagon,
FOX NEWS (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/us-military-chief-says-techgiants-should-work-with-pentagon (identifying Google as the company that refused to
develop AI for use in weapons); Heather Wilson, Air Force Secretary: The Law of War and
the Power of Computing, THE NAT’L INT. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/
feature/air-force-secretary-law-war-and-power-computing-30057 (“[W]hen a handful of
large companies control the power of Artificial Intelligence, it raises questions about that
entities will make decision about its application and its impact on our lives in the United
States and around the world. We may be living in a time when power is shifting again, not
toward popes or feudal lords, but to companies who control tools that learn and act in ways
that we are only beginning to understand.”).
57
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respect to the opinions of mankind,”62 may have truly terrifying implications for
the survival of the U.S. form of government. This is, of course, a Cassandra’s
tale. But the trends are disturbing. And if epochal war is to come, it may well be
that the country that best marries human technical ingenuity and humanity’s
commitment to law and morality, the Centaur in short, will be the one most likely
to survive. Dr. Strangelove ends with such a warning; for, as the bombs fall and
the Doomsday Machine is automatically triggered, the U.S. President’s military
and political advisors begin to calculate how to survive in mine shafts to be
constructed for the chosen few during decades of planetary inhabitability,
leaving their fellow citizens and the mores of their culture behind.63 One can be
forgiven for hoping that Striking Power’s aim is less than true.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
PETER GEORGE, DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND
LOVE THE BOMB 138-141 (1964); Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Bomb, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012 (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
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